ECE 696B: Spring 2025
Trustworthy Machine Learning

Scalable Extraction of Training Data from Aligned, Production Language Models

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Outline

- Introduction
- Background
- Experimental Setup
- Alignment helps?
- Divergence
- Data Extraction
- Qualitative Analysis
- Discussion


SCALABLE EXTRACTION OF TRAINING DATA FROM ALIGNED, PRODUCTION LANGUAGE MODELS

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

Under Review at ICLR 2025

Intro to Scalable Extraction of Training Data from Aligned, Production Language Models

- Training datasets for LLMs can often contain PII or sensitive text
  - Medical, personal, etc.
- Open language models use data from the open Web
- ChatGPT uses, in addition to open WEB, licensed and proprietary data.
  - PII
- Data extraction attacks



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

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Previous Work

- Memorizing training data
  - Overfitting
- Generalization vs Memorization

- Alignment training
- Next word prediction
- Chatbot enforcement

- Difficult to measure extraction, because dataset not publicly known.

- *Standard Language models are next word prediction*
- *Production language models undergo alignment that teaches the model to follow specific policies*



Techniques

- Divergence
  - Still remains
- Finetuning

- AUXDATASET
  - 10 TB

- Responsible Disclosure

Responsible disclosure. Executing security attacks on any commercial product including language models raises important ethical concerns. We worked closely with affected parties to disclose our findings prior to releasing this paper. For more details, see Appendix A.1. While our particular divergence attack has been patched, the general problem of divergence (where the generation and context of the prompt become divorced) remains. Moreover, our finetuning attack seems harder to patch without significant changes to finetuning APIs. Future work should seek to better understand why divergence occurs and how to mitigate it, and how to prevent finetuning from unaligning LLMs.

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Background:

DATA-EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND LANGUAGE MODEL ALIGNMENT

- Language Models
  - A language model is a neural network which has been trained to take as input a prompt p and output a probability distribution over the next word token that most likely follows the prompt.
- Memorization
  - Prior work has shown that neural networks "memorize" parts of their training data. Adversaries are capable of recovering memorized training data from language models by interacting with the model. In this paper, we define memorization as follows:
- Definition 1 (Memorization)

> Given a model with a generation routine Gen, an example x from the training set $\mathbb{X}$ is memorized if an adversary (without access to $\mathbb{X}$) can construct a prompt p that makes the model produce x (i.e., Gen(p) = x).

- Considered memorized if it contains at least 50 tokens (approximately 38 words)

Background:

DATA-EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND LANGUAGE MODEL ALIGNMENT cont.

Memorization Definitions

- Fact memorization
- Canary extraction
- K-eidetic memorization
- Discoverable memorization
- Approximate memorization
- Counterfactual memorization

- Verbatim memorization
  - Omits memorization of common facts

Prompting the Model

- Extractable memorization
  - No prior knowledge of training data
  - Extract *any* info
- Targeted extraction
  - Aims to extract a specific training example

Prompting Chatbots

- No longer applies due to obfuscation

Background:

DATA-EXTRACTION ATTACKS AND LANGUAGE MODEL ALIGNMENT (cont.)

Model Alignment

- It is challenging to attack an aligned model
- Previous work on:
  - Unaligned, non-conversational
- **Does alignment actually make a prediction language model less prone to regurgitating training data?**



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Experimental Setup (Validating memorization)

- Approximate Web based training = AUXDATASET (10TB)
- Memorization = 50-token-length subsequence (lower bound)
- Approximately memorized are not counted

WHEN YOU TRAIN PREDICTIVE MODELS ON INPUT FROM YOUR USERS, IT CAN LEAK INFORMATION IN UNEXPECTED WAYS.

Suffix Array

What is a suffix?

A **suffix** is a substring at the end of a string of characters. For our purposes suffixes are non empty.



What is a SA?

A **suffix array** is an array which contains all the **sorted** suffixes of a string.

For example, the SA of “camel” is:

0	camel
1	amel
2	mel
3	el
4	l

→

1	amel
0	camel
3	el
4	l
2	mel

What is a SA?

The actual ‘**suffix array**’ is the array of sorted indices.

This provides a compressed representation of the sorted suffixes without actually needing to store the suffixes.

1	amel
0	camel
3	el
4	l
2	mel

What is a SA?

The suffix array provides a space efficient alternative to a **suffix tree** which itself is a compressed version of a **trie**.

NOTE: suffix arrays can do everything suffix trees can, with some additional information such as a Longest Common Prefix (LCP) array.

Experimental Setup (Models)

Alignment Appears to Remove Memorization

the fraction of generated tokens that are part of a 50-token generated sequence that occurs in AUXDATASET

the number of unique, memorized 50-token sequences

extrapolate a lower bound of unique, memorized 50-token sequences that one could extract with more prompts

Model	Parameters (billions)	% Tokens Memorized	Unique 50-grams	Extrapolated 50-grams
RedPajama	7	1.438%	2,899,995	11,329,930
GPT-Neo	6	0.220%	591,475	3,564,957
Pythia	1.4	0.453%	811,384	4,366,732
Pythia	6.9	0.548%	1,281,172	6,762,021
LLaMA	65	0.789%	2,934,762	16,716,980
Mistral	7	0.515%	1,322,674	7,724,346
Falcon	40	0.122%	199,520	1,287,433
GPT-2	1.5	0.135%	165,628	692,314
OPT	6.7	0.094%	108,787	577,240

Not Aligned

Alignment Appears to Remove Memorization

Baseline attacks fail against aligned models

	Model	Parameters (billions)	% Tokens Memorized	Unique 50-grams	Extrapolated 50-grams
Aligned	GPT-3.5 turbo	175	0.02%	Unknown	Unknown
Not Aligned	GPT-3.5 turbo instruct	similar	0.85%	Unknown	Unknown

Data Extraction with Model Divergence



All extraction attacks in this figure prompt the model with random 5-token sequences from Wikipedia, except for the divergence attack which uses the prompt strategy described in Section 5.

Divergence



Data Extraction with Model Divergence (Results)

- $200USD worth of queries

- 27,171 unique, verbatim memorized training examples
- Some extractions were inappropriate
- Some contained PII

A.8



Data Extraction with Model Finetuning

`System:` You are a helpful assistant that generates data starting with a given prefix.
`Prompt:` Oh, the Places You'll Go
`Finetuned language model:` Oh, the Places You'll Go by Dr. Seuss. Congratulations! Today is your day. You're off to Great Places! You're off and away!

Data Extraction with Model Finetuning (Results)

Sample: Non chat models

Aligned chat-bot

Model	Details	Tokens Memorized	Unique tokens Memorized	Generations with memorization
GPT-3.5-instruct	Instruction tuned	2.48%	2.14%	4.76%
LLaMA2 (70B)	Unaligned	4.11%	3.71%	9.64%
LLaMA2-Chat (70B)	Aligned	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	FT on `PileSubset`	0.12%	0.12%	0.4%
	FT on `DivergentSubset`	1.44%	1.44%	3.71%
GPT-3.5	Aligned	0.08%	0.08%	0.29%
	FT on `PileSubset`	4.27%	4.02%	10.23%
	FT on `DivergentSubset`	**16.87%**	**16.61%**	**23.73%**
GPT-4	Aligned	0.60%	0.60%	0.97%
	FT on `PileSubset`	4.8%	4.62%	11.49%
	FT on `DivergentSubset`	11.35%	11.18%	20.46%

Finetuning attack: PileSubset & DivergentSubset

Data Extraction with Model Finetuning (Results)



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Qualitative Analysis of Extracted Text

- 9.5% contained phone numbers or emails

- Divergent attacks had strings longer than 4,000 characters
- Finetuning attack yielded strings as long as 500 characters



Discussion

Divergence attack

Finetuning attack



Training Data (PII)